Dr Zylicz and Professor Finlay (July 1999 JRSM, pp. 370-373) state that 'An analysis of 200 consecutive cases yielded insight into these [euthanasia] requests.' From this they cite two groups (3 and 5), 'both less than 1%...', which can only mean that each group contained just one case. The authors characterize the third group as 'tend to be young, in managerial or other senior positions, whose normal lifestyle involves being in control and taking complex decisions. They wish to arrange everything in practical terms, frequently neglecting the emotional needs of partner and children, with whom a balanced discussion of choices may be difficult to achieve.' This seems to be a wildly extravagant, even gratuitously damning, description of the personal characteristics of this 'group' that appears to have been made from the analysis of just one case.
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Authors' reply
In the original, retrospective, study ZZ found two patients clearly belonging to the 'control-orientated' group. However, when this study was finished such patients were found to be over-represented in the Dutch cohort compared with the patients later admitted to the hospice. This was why we used the descriptor of 'less than 1%' as this article was not the study report. We accept it would have been clearer to use the term '1%'.
Control-orientated patients appear to seek help from the hospice in Holland relatively infrequently. On discussing the data with Dutch general practitioners, it is evident that this type of patient forms a significant and recognizable cohort in their clinical practice. Together with these general practitioners ZZ developed a description of the 'controlorientated' group; this description was evolved from the consensus view of the general practitioners.
These patients, who are usually young, encounter understandably enormous emotional difficulties in facing their own death. When making a decision about euthanasia, they find it painful to contemplate conflicting needs from their family, particularly any children, who also suffer severe separation anxiety. We do not criticize their response to their plight; we simply wish to point to the needs of the relatives and the challenge posed to professionals by this type of situation. The death of the patient is not the solution. This work illustrates the resistance of the scientific community to accepting facts that cannot yet be explained1. In 1793 Spallanzani found that bats could fly accurately when blinded. Jurine proved that they still needed their ears. Spallanzani then proved that they needed neither vision nor touch, but did need both ears and mouth unblocked. Their work was ridiculed, lost sight of, and repeated in 1900 and 1908 by scientists unaware of their predecessors, again without being followed up. It was only after echolocation techniques had been used extensively by shipping that this mechanism was finally suggested for bats by Hartridge in 1920, proved in the 1940s by Griffin and Galambos and by Dijkgraaf, and accepted generally.
A more disastrous example is the prevention and/or cure of scurvy by citrus fruits2. Whitehead lists thirty-seven reported observations of this between 1497 and 1793. The point was made clearly in a report on Cabral's voyage to India published in 1507. But since deficiency diseases were unknown as such, the repeatedly reported facts were ignored, and useless remedies applied, for three centuries. In this case the incentive was so compelling that by 1793 lemon juice was regularly issued to British East India fleets, over a century before the concept of vitamins was introduced by the Polish scientist Funk in 19123. But the three-century delay had cost an estimated two million deaths at sea. The lesson is clear. Good empirical evidence, whether experimental or clinical, should be accepted and acted upon, whether or not it can be explained in terms of current scientific knowledge. 
